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1. Introduction 
 
The 1997 Asian crisis, the failure of the Washington Consensus, and the surge of global imbalances are 
arguably  the  three  main  reasons  lying  behind  the  tendency  to  rediscover  Keynes’s  work  as  an 
international economist. While previous analyses of the faults of the “non-system” which replaced the 
Bretton Woods regime seemed to confirm the “end of the Keynesian era” (Skidelsky, 1977), the early 
cracks of the integrationist agenda of the Nineties and the difficulties of coping with its legacy in terms 
of global imbalances have brought about a renewed interest in Keynes’s thought. The rediscovery of 
both the “embedded liberalism” of Bretton Woods and Keynes’s proposals for a better ordering of 
international economic relations after WWII understandably occurs at the end of a trial which sees 
Williamson’s paradigm accused of providing the tool itself for the integrationist agenda (see Cedrini, 
2008a). More surprising, perhaps, are suggestions of international monetary reform by Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2006), among others, agreeing with Post-Keynesian economists’ analyses (see Davidson, 2002) 
on the need to rescue the systemic character of Keynes’s schemes for a “sounder political economy 
between all nations” (CW XXV, p.43).  
The comparison between today’s nonsystem and the successful experience of Bretton Woods, 
or even the pre-war gold standard and its “socially-constructed monetary agreement that included a 
simple  set  of  rules  around  which  core  lenders  and  borrowers  could  build  expectations  of  a  stable 
future” (Unctad, 2004, p.92), may provide good reasons to give a second look at Keynes’s thinking 
about globalization. But revisiting Keynes means approaching a well-defined vision of international 
economic  relations,  as  shown  by  David  Vines’  (2003)  review  of  Skidelsky’s  Fighting  for  Britain 
(2000); “a vision of global capitalism as an inter-national system” (Vines, 2003, p.357), deriving from 
“an  extraordinarily  clear  understanding  of  how  pieces  of  global  economy  interact,  driven  by  the 
policies of autonomous nations, in an only partly coherent manner” (ibid, p.339). At the end of his   3 
essay, Vines invites to rethink the content of Keynes’s “international macroeconomics”, but above all 
his  contributions  on  “focus  and  method”  (ibid,  p.358).  Unlike  modern  microeconomic  models  of 
international interaction, Vines remarks, Keynes’s vision was anti-utilitarian and fully aware of the 
impossibility of understanding international relations solely by means of rational action theory.  
The most remarkable example offered to demonstrate, against Skidelsky, that Keynes must be 
rescued  for,  rather  than  from  the  economists  is  Vines’s  lecture  of  Keynes’s  1945  memorandum 
Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III as a threefold model of international adjustment. The well-
known mutually exclusive alternatives outlined by Keynes for Britain’s transition to the new order – 
the Starvation Corner and its policies of austerity and isolationism, the Temptation to canalize Britain’s 
Sterling debts into a single US loan, in exchange for the acceptance of the American conception of the 
international system, and Justice, i.e. a plan for sharing the war burden between Britain, the US and the 
Sterling Area – are shown to provide a much useful theoretical framework for the ongoing debate about 
the ways out from the 1997 East Asian crisis. Likewise, the three options may serve as a powerful 
theoretical guide to avoid getting lost in the extremely complicated picture of competing views about 
the insurgence of current global imbalances and organize them according to the unilateral, bilateral or 
multilateral character of the adjustment they propose (Carabelli and Cedrini, 2007). 
That Keynes’s model does not seem to lose validity despite the time elapsed may owe really 
much to the “focus and method” of his work. We explore the hypothesis of consistency between, on the 
one  side,  Keynes’s  conception  and  practice  of  economics,  which  qualifies  him  as  a  thinker  of 
complexity (Marchionatti, 2002), and the “method”, i.e. the way of reasoning in economics (Carabelli, 
1988) underlying his approach to the complexity of international economic relations. The focus is on 
The Economic Consequences of the Peace and Keynes’s economic diplomacy in the aftermath of WWI. 
We argue that both his criticisms of the Treaty of Versailles and the multilateral approach he envisaged 
for the settlement of international imbalances brought about or consolidated by the war were shaped by   4 
the use of a method reflecting the characteristics of the complex material he had to investigate on. A 
method, in other words, enabling Keynes to tackle organic interdependence among the variables of the 
European system without theoretically reducing its complexity.  
Three major attributes of Keynes’s notion of complexity (see Carabelli and De Vecchi, 2000) 
are here inquired into detail: i) organic interdependence, which underlies the whole analysis developed 
in  Keynes’s  pamphlet;  ii)  “tragic”  dilemmas  and  fallacies  of  composition  between  particular  and 
general interests, and iii) the need for “public” or social – that is, beyond the reach of the individual – 
solutions to be provided from external sources of relief but conceived, at the same time, as mechanisms 
to promote “shared responsibilities” approaches to international imbalances. Methodological coherence 
between Keynes’s reform plans in 1919 and those of the Forties may allow to explain the rationale of 
the most controversial episode of Keynes’s diplomacy, i.e. his call for an American Gift to Britain in 
1945, and induce to reappraise Skidelsky’s (2000) “fighting for Britain” view of Keynes’s work after 
1937.  
 
2. Complexity and organic interdependence 
 
Keynes regarded his Indian Currency and Finance as the attempt to bring out the fact that  
the Indian system is an exceedingly coherent one. Every part of the Indian system fits 
into some other part. It is impossible to say everything at once, and an author must needs 
sacrifice from time to time the complexity and interdependence of fact in the interest of 
the  clearness  of  his  exposition.  But  the  complexity  and  the  coherence  of  the  system 
require  the  constant  attention  of  anyone  who  would  criticize  its  parts.  This  is  not  a 
peculiarity of Indian finance. It is the characteristic of all monetary problems (CW I, 
pp.181-82). 
 
The notion of “complexity and interdependence” recurs frequently in Keynes’s writings. As known, in 
his exchange with Roy Harrod concerning the latter’s “Scope and Method in Economics”, Keynes 
defined economics as a “moral science”, “a branch of logic, a way of thinking ... in terms of models   5 
joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world” (CW XIV, p.297). 
It is in the “nature of economic thinking”, he had observed in the General Theory, that to cope with the 
complexity of the economy without abstracting from variability, “after we have reached a provisional 
conclusion by isolating the complicating factors one by one, we then have to go back on ourselves and 
allow, as well as we can, for the probable interactions of the factors among themselves” (CW VII, 
p.297). Accordingly, Keynes’s methodological criticism of the classical theory was grounded on the 
tacit  introduction  of  the  “atomic  hypothesis”  and  consequent  failure  to  deal  with  organic 
interdependence (Carabelli, 1991).  
The  literature  concerning  the  continuity  between  Keynes’s  methodological  approach  to 
probability and the way of reasoning about the economic material underlying his mature economic 
writings  stresses  the  centrality,  in  Keynes’s  thought,  of  organic  interdependence  among  economic 
variables  (see  Dow  and  Hillard,  1995).  Similarities  are  shown  to  exist between  the  focusing  of A 
Treatise on Probability on problems of measurement and comparison of magnitudes, which derive 
from probability being regarded as an organic, complex and incommensurable magnitude, and attempts 
made by Keynes to cope with manifold, multidimensional economic magnitudes and the uncertainty 
which  is  associated  with  them  (Carabelli,  1988).  In  A  Treatise  on  Money,  Keynes  refers  to  core 
economic magnitudes, like purchasing power, which “are complex or manifold in the sense that they 
are capable of variations of degree in more than one mutually incommensurable direction at the same 
time” (CW V, p.88). Heterogeneity in dimension, he later observed in the General Theory – “To say 
that net output is greater, but the price level lower, than ten years ago or one year ago, is a proposition 
of similar character to the statement that Queen Victoria was a better queen but not a happier woman 
than Queen Elizabeth” (CW VII, p.40) – prevents the comparison between two complex magnitudes. 
As  Keynes  pointed  out  in  his  1926  Essay  on  Edgeworth,  complexity  combines  with  organic 
interdependence so that   6 
the  atomic  hypothesis  which  had  worked  so  splendidly  in  physics  breaks  down  in 
psychics. We are faced at every turn with the problem of organic unity, of discreteness, of 
discontinuity – the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparison of quantity fails 
us, small changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous 
continuum are not satisfied (CW X, p.262). 
 
Still unexplored is the relevance of this methodological positions for understanding how Keynes came 
to construct his international macroeconomics and diplomacy. Yet, The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace is undeniably dominated by “complexity and interdependence” and may be described as an essay 
against  the  atomic  hypothesis  in  international  relations.  Keynes’s  criticism  of  the  “Treaty’s  [of 
Versailles] wisdom and expediency” was based on that it 
ignores  the  economic  solidarity  of  Europe,  and  by  aiming  at  the  distruction  of  the 
economic life of Germany it threatens the health and prosperity of the Allies themselves 
(CW XVII, p.58).  
 
Rather, it should have been a duty of the settlement to defend the “economic unity of Europe” – the 
first of the “main thesis of my book” (ibid, p.88) – by preserving the economic (and territorial) integrity 
of Germany, the heart of the European “body” (CW II, p.2), on which the unity was grounded. The 
structure itself of the book reinforces the view of European organic interdependence as the main focus 
of Keynes’s work: the triptych Peace Conference-Treaty of Versailles-reparations is the centre of a 
wider framework linking “Europe before the War” with “Europe after the Treaty”. 
Europe is solid with herself. France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Holland, Russia and 
Roumania and Poland, throb together, and their structure and civilization are essentially 
one. They flourished together, they have rocked together in a war, which we, in spite of 
our enormous contributions and sacrifices (like though in a less degree than America), 
economically  stood  outside,  and  they  may  fall  together.  In  this  lies  the  destructive 
significance of the Peace of Paris (ibid).  
 
Disregarding Wilson’s “Fourteen points” and their insistence on Germany’s integrity as a precondition 
for  the  recovery  of  Europe,  the  Treaty  had  seriously  impaired  Germany’s  chance  of  restoring 
prosperity and strengthened a tendency toward international disequilibrium. Before the war, Keynes 
observed,   7 
[r]ound Germany as a central support the rest of the European economic system grouped 
itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany the prosperity of the rest of the 
Continent  mainly  depended.  The  increasing  pace of  Germany  gave  her  neighbors an 
outlet for their products, in exchange for which the enterprise of the German merchant 
supplied them with their chief requirements at a low price (ibid, pp.9-10).  
 
“The statistics of the economic interdependence of Germany and her neighbors are overwhelming” 
(ibid, p.10), he argued. Best customer of countries like Russia, Italy and Austria-Hungary, second best 
customer of Great Britain (after India) and third best customer of France, Germany was “the largest 
source of supply to Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, 
Roumania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain” (ibid) after the US, 
and to France. But Germany was a provider of capital and, what is more, organization, contributing to 
the  development  of  East  European  countries.  By  showing  on  how  “sandy  and  false”  (ibid,  p.1) 
foundations on which the European “economic Eldorado” (ibid, p.6) was based, namely a certain 
“psychology of society” (ibid, p.11) and a peculiar win-win “relation of the Old World to the New” 
(ibid, p.13), “war had so shaken this system as to endanger the life of Europe altogether” (ibid, p.15): 
it  was  the  task  of  the  Conference  to  settle  Europe  on  new  bases,  but  this  required  a  careful 
consideration of those factors which superseded “the existing order of [the European] society” (ibid, 
p.23). The “Carthaginian peace” Party was too little aware of “the deeper economic tendencies which 
are to govern the future” (ibid, p.22).  
Keynes’s book was to remind politicians – especially Clemenceau (see CW II, pp.20-21) – and 
the public opinion that the European system was an organic world. The introduction of the atomic 
hypothesis  for  the  convenience  of  a  clear-cut  settlement  of  Europe,  masking  the  Allies’  desire  to 
impose on Germany the unworkable clauses of a highly punitive Treaty and the whole burden of the 
costs of the war, was destined to transform inter-European relations into a social conflict of the “lose-
lose” kind, as shown in Chapters IV and V. The final articles of the Treaty and exhorbitant requests for 
reparations could but lead Germany to ruin, and Europe with it:   8 
The  German  economic  system  as  it  existed  before  the  war  depended  on  three  main 
factors: I. Overseas commerce as represented by her mercantile marine, her colonies, her 
foreign investments, her exports, and the overseas connections of her merchants; II. The 
exploitation of her coal and iron and the industries built upon them; III. Her transport and 
tariff system. Of these the first, while not the least important, was certainly the most 
vulnerable. The Treaty aims at the systematic destruction of all three, but principally of 
the first two (ibid, p.41). 
 
“We cannot both deprive Germany of her sources of wealth and also expect her to save on her pre-war 
standards for the purpose of paying a tribute”, Keynes had commented (in Markwell, 2006, p.41) on 
27 October 1916 while preparing the well-known memorandum he later signed with Ashley. Being 
aware,  now,  that  by  aiming  at  the  destruction  of  Germany,  the  Allies  were  inviting  their  own 
destruction too (CW II, p.2), he tried to convince the world that “whatever the other merits or evils of 
the treaty, its real vice was its failure to treat Europe as an economic whole and to reconstruct it for the 
benefit of the common people. It was a treaty of strategy and national greediness – with the League of 
Nations thrown in to make it look pretty” (Martin, 1946).  
 
3. The dilemmas and conflicts of an impending catastroph 
 
Keynes’s main concerns were for the Treaty’s dispositions about German coal and iron. The former 
had been the key factor of industrial growth and, more specifically, of “organization” (CW II, p.9) in 
Central Europe and a symbol of the economic unity of the continent. The obligations to cede the Saar 
Basin to France and Upper Silesia to Poland and to compensate France for estimated losses incurred 
due to German war were accompanied by the requirement that part of the reparations – to France, Italy, 
Belgium and Luxemburg – should be paid in kind, i.e. in coal or coke. This was an unprecedented 
sanction for a defeated enemy, since  
Hitherto, a sum has been fixed, and the nation mulcted has been left free to devise and 
select for itself the means of payment. But in this case the payees can (for a certain period) 
not  only  demand  a  certain  sum  but  specify  the  particular  kind  of  property  in  which 
payment is to be effected. Thus the powers of the Reparation Commission [...] can be   9 
employed to destroy Germany’s commercial and economic organization as well as to 
exact payment (ibid, p.49).  
 
Germany was required to cede to the Allies 40,000,000 coal tons annually out of an estimated annual 
output  reduced  to  100,000,000  coal  tons,  so  that  only  60,000,000  would  have  been  available  for 
Germany’s own use. It seemed obvious to Keynes that the country 
cannot export coal in the near future (and will even be dependent on her Treaty rights to 
purchase in Upper Silesia), if she is to continue as an industrial nation. Every million 
tons she is forced to export must be at the expense of closing down an industry (ibid, 
p.57).  
 
The coal settlement was leading European policymakers into a “real dilemma” (ibid, p.58). Due to the 
“desperate” (ibid) European overall coal position, France and Italy would have done their best to 
secure their reparations in kind. Their case, Keynes conceded, was grounded on justice and possessed 
“unanswerable force from a certain point of view” (ibid), so that a conflict was bound to arise between 
different ethical claims which could scarcely be weighted one against the other – justice for the Allies, 
and the moral obligation of Wilson’s Fourteen Points to a peace of magnanimity.  
The position will be truly represented as a question between German industry on the one 
side and French and Italian industry on the other. It may be admitted that the surrender of 
the coal will destroy German industry, but it may be equally true that its non-surrender 
will jeopardize French and Italian industry (ibid, pp.58-59).  
 
“In such a case”, he wondered, “must not the victors with their treaty rights prevail, especially when 
much of the damage has been ultimately due to the wicked acts of those who are now defeated?” (ibid, 
p.59).  Nevertheless,  Keynes  remarked  using  concepts  frequently  recurring  in  modern  theory  of 
complexity,  should  the  “unanswerable  force”  of  French  and  Italian  requests  to  Germany  “prevail 
beyond what wisdom would recommend, the reactions on the social and economic life of Central 
Europe will be far too strong to be confined within their original limits” (ibid).  
Much more alarming, the effects of the fallacy of composition between the conflicting, though 
legitimate,  individual  interests  of  the  European  countries  would  have  likely  resulted  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  whole  continent.  In  case  of  surrender  of  German  coal,  Northern  Europe  and   10 
Austria-Hungary, in particular, would have been deprived of their supplies, and the latter brought to 
ruin. Germany’s neutral neighbours should have necessarily recurred to “international barter” (ibid), 
i.e. to exchange German coal against materials which Germany rightly regarded as essential to its 
development or even survival. This was “an extraordinary complication as compared with the former 
almost perfect simplicity of international trade” (ibid, p.60), Keynes wrote twenty years before his 
heretic statements about Schachtianism, but it “may produce the coal where other devices would fail” 
(ibid). Still, France and Italy could not have tolerated Germany resorting to international barter to buy 
vital imports against its coal unless treaty obligations were met first.  
In this there will be a great show of justice, and it will be difficult to weigh against such 
claims the possible facts that, while German miners will work for butter, there is no 
available means of compelling them to get coal, the sale of which will bring in nothing, 
and that if Germany has no coal to send to her neighbors she may fail to secure imports 
essential to her economic existence (ibid).  
 
But then, with France and Italy allowed to secure their shares of German coal, and the rest of Europe 
contented with what is left,  
the industrial future of Europe is black and the prospects of revolution very good. It is a 
case where particular interests and particular claims, however well founded in sentiment 
or in justice, must yield to sovereign expediency (ibid). 
 
The repeated use in Keynes’s pamphlet of the term “dilemma”, all the more so in a situation, in his 
own words, of “impending catastrophe” with “all the elements of ancient tragedy” (ibid, p.3), is not to 
be overlooked. The existence of a plurality of moral ends and values moving into opposite directions 
and yet all of them making claims upon the decision-makers, which engenders the possibility of an 
irreducible clash between them, is typical of ancient Greek tragedy and classical dramas. As shown by 
Carabelli (1998), Keynes’s early writings are disseminated with references to Greek tragedy, which 
shaped  his  tragic  view  of  ethics  and  aesthetics  and  stimulated  his  interest  in  moral  and  rational 
dilemmas. Dilemmas quite obviously concern  Keynes’s treatment of probability as the hypothesis 
upon which it is reasonable to act and a guide of life. But they enter the realm of economics as well,   11 
since they are based on those same incommensurability and non-comparability of moral or rational 
reasons for action which characterize situations of radical uncertainty (Carabelli and De Vecchi, 2000).  
A moral conflict for the European body charged with the settlement of the continent (the Four 
and the Commission of Reparations), the coal settlement assumes the forms of a rational dilemma, 
arising from conflicting reasons for decision, for France and Italy, who are bound to recognize that 
If  the  European  Civil War is to  end  with  France  and  Italy  abusing  their  momentary 
victorious power to destroy Germany and Austria-Hungary now prostrate, they invite 
their  own  destruction  also,  being  so  deeply  and  inextricably  intertwined  with  their 
victims by hidden psychic and economic bonds (CW II, p.2). 
 
At a more general level, Keynes concluded, nationalism and “private interest” (ibid, p.60) were to 
impose new “economic frontier[s]” – which nonetheless “sentiment and historic justice require” (ibid) 
– destined to diminish economic efficiency and organization to the detriment of the general needs of 
the continent. Due to the logic of interdependence which dominated European economic relations, 
competing “particular interests and particular claims” (ibid) were at the origins of a conflict between 
individual and social interest, which Keynes pictured in metaphorical language: 
men have devised ways to impoverish themselves and one another and prefer collective 
animosities to individual happiness (ibid, p.62). 
 
In Keynes’s thought, conflicts of this kind are brought about by individual initiatives which – as in the 
case of the paradox of savings of the Treatise on Money – “if taken by an individual [...] would benefit 
him, but do not benefit anybody if they become shared, that is if everybody adopts them” (Carabelli 
and De Vecchi, 2000, pp.231-232). Due to uncertainty and ignorance, individuals are induced to shape 
conventional rather than reasonable expectations, so that, as Keynes made clear in The End of Laissez-
Faire, “it may even be to the interest of individuals to aggravate the disease” (CW IX, pp.290-91) to 
their own disadvantage. The same for Germany’s creditors, who were confronted with the possibility of 
sacrificing their future individual happiness on the altar of collective animosities, however profitable –   12 
economically and politically – it could appear to them in the short term. Rather, only apparently a 
paradox, to extract a larger volume of reparations the Allies should have  
“nurse[d]” the trade and industry of Germany for a period of five or ten years, supplying 
her with large loans, and with ample shipping, food, and raw materials during that period, 
building up markets for her, and deliberately applying all their resources and goodwill to 
making her the greatest industrial nation in Europe, if not in the world (CW II, p.128), 
 
As known, reparations had not been established on the basis of Germany’s capacity to pay. This was 
the criterion Keynes and Asquith adopted in their 1916 memorandum on the issue while discussing the 
extent of the analogy between WWI reparations and the indemnities paid by France to Germany after 
the former’s defeat in the 1870 conflict. Due to starvation and war debts, currency depreciation and the 
loss  of  colonies,  overseas  investments,  mercantile  marine,  territories,  population,  coal  and  iron, 
Germany’s annual savings at the end of the conflict were strongly reduced with respect to their pre-
war volume. Uncertainty reigned as regards the possibility – which only a sensible lowering of the 
standard of life could secure – to convert a surplus available for home investments into a surplus 
available for exports. Germany would have not attained, for a long time being, her pre-war capacity to 
pay an annual foreign tribute. And yet, against this evidence, a tacit assumption had been introduced to 
justify Europeans claims: 
most estimates of a great indemnity from Germany depend on the assumption that she is 
in a position to conduct in the future a vastly greater trade than ever she has had in the 
past (ibid, p.84). 
 
The analysis of the pre-war trade balance suggested that Germany should rather adjust consumption 
and production to cover a likely post-war deficit: raw materials and food accounted for two thirds of 
total imports, whose shrinking would have led to further difficulties in stimulating the production of 
manufactures to be sold in foreign markets. Above all, rising exports were prevented by the Treaty 
clauses (in the case of coal), by the incapability to expand trade of goods produced in small aggregates 
(cotton  and  wool)  and  by  the  Allies’  fears  lest  Germany  could  launch  a  competitive  struggle  on 
international markets against their own interests. To obtain repayment, Britain should have favoured   13 
Germany competitiveness in exchange for fifteen per cent of the reparations only. Yet, Lloyd George 
knew that  being  the  first  and  the  most resolute  to proclaim  the  need  to  punish Germany  was  an 
indispensable asset in the general election of 1918, and acted accordingly. Therefore, the Treaty’s 
dispositions about reparations turned out to be a “compromise between the Prime Minister’s pledge to 
the British electorate to claim the entire costs of the war and the pledge to the contrary which the 
Allies had given to Germany at the armistice” (ibid, pp.99-99). The hopes nurtured by Lloyd George 
had in fact 
set  him  at  variance  with  the  [US]  President,  and  on  the  other  hand  with  competing 
interests to those of France and Belgium. The clearer it became that but little could be 
expected  from  Germany,  the  more  necessary  it  was  to  exercise  patriotic  greed  and 
“sacred egotism” and snatch the bone from the juster claims and greater need of France 
or the well-founded expectations of Belgium (ibid, p.92). 
 
Two different kinds of “false statement” (ibid, p.99), one relative to the enemy’s capacity to pay and 
the other to justice for the Allies, prevented the possibility to determine an exact amount of reparations. 
“The fixing of either of these figures presented a dilemma” (ibid, pp.99-100), wrote Keynes:  
A  figure  for  Germany’s  prospective  capacity  to  pay,  not  too  much  in  excess  of  the 
estimates of most candid and well-informed authorities, would have fallen hopelessly far 
short  of  popular  expectations  both  in  England  and  in  France.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
definitive  figure  for  damage  done  which  would  not  disastrously  disappoint  the 
expectations which had been raised in France and Belgium might have been incapable of 
substantiation  under  challenge,  and  open  to  damaging  criticism  on  the  part  of  the 
Germans, who were believed to have been prudent enough to accumulate considerable 
evidence as to the extent of their own misdoings (ibid, p.100). 
 
Uncertainty about the amount of reparations to be imposed on Germany was thus functional to the 
short-term individual interests of the parts involved, but its burden of negative consequences on the 
future  of  Europe  could  not  be  underestimated.  Unsurprisingly,  chapter  VI  of  The  Economic 
Consequences of the Peace was  
one of pessimism. The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of 
Europe,—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to 
stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any 
way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement   14 
was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust 
the systems of the Old World and the New (ibid). 
 
Europe  should  remedy,  in  the  immediate  future,  a  reduction  in  internal  productivity  and  a  great 
limitation of its ability to import supplies from overseas. Lowered coal production was obviously a 
matter of serious concern, “[b]ut even when coal can be got and grain harvested, the breakdown of the 
European  railway system prevents their carriage; and even when goods can be  manufactured,  the 
breakdown  of  the  European  currency  system  prevents  their  sale”  (ibid,  p.147).  Keynes  devoted 
considerable attention to “the breakdown of transport and exchange by means of which its products 
could  be  conveyed  where  they  were  most  wanted”  (ibid,  p.146),  and  believed  that  the  currency 
problem  could  irreparably  break  the  links  of  the  economic  unity  of  the  continent.  Persistent 
generalized inflation during and after the war had brought a serious attack against “confidence in the 
equity of the existing distribution of wealth” (ibid, p.149) and disordered the relationships between 
debtors and creditors.  
A  confirm  that  the  pre-war  order  was  definitely  over  could  be  traced  in  the  effects  of 
uncertainty about European currencies’ values on domestic and foreign trade. The much required price 
regulation inevitably impeded the working of the normal adjustment mechanism between domestic 
and foreign prices, so that essential goods should be imported or provided by the government, “which, 
in re-selling the goods below cost price, plunges thereby a little further into insolvency” (ibid, p.152). 
Uncertainty about the mark’s future value makes the purchase with foreign credit of raw materials or 
manufactured a “hazardous enterprise” (ibid, p.153), while the gap between domestic and external 
prices and reduced individual credit abroad were dramatically impairing Germany’s chance of raising 
its import trade to the level required by reconstruction. France and Italy were equally unprepared for 
the return to normal economic conditions: the former should find means of covering the excess of 
imports over exports, hitherto financed through Britain’s assistance, while the latter was faced with the   15 
collapse of Austria, historically a relevant market for its exports, and the effects of raising world prices 
on its dependence on imported raw materials. 
 The  budgetary  positions  of  the  two  countries,  as  well  as  of  the  other  belligerants,  was 
desperate; Russia, Hungary and Austria “were the signal to us of how in the final catastrophe the 
malady of the body passes over into malady of the mind” (ibid, p.158). Keynes knew that economic 
interdependence, causing the European system to react more than proportionally to variations in the 
initial conditions, could but render the overall picture even darker. He described Europe after the 
Treaty as threatened by a “catastroph” (ibid, p.145) and compared it with those “catastrophs of past 
history which have thrown back human progress for centuries” (ibid, p.146), emerged as “the reactions 
following  on  the  sudden  termination,  whether  in  the  course  of  Nature  or  by  the  act  of  man,  of 
temporarily favourable conditions which have permitted the growth of population beyond what could 
be provided for when the favourable conditions were at an end” (ibid).  
 
4. The way out of the impasse 
 
While searching for remedies, Keynes maintained that complexity was truly the crux of the problem, 
i.e.  the  element  associating  with  and  somewhat  favouring  the  impasse,  as  seen,  but  also,  not 
unexpectedly, the only way out of it: 
in so complex a phenomenon the prognostics do not all point one way; and we may make 
the error of expecting consequences to follow too swiftly and too inevitably from what 
perhaps are not all the relevant causes (ibid, p.160).  
 
A revision of the Treaty and of the “wild and fantastic chimera” (CW XVI, p.336) of asking Germany 
to cover through reparations the whole sum of the Allied war (£24-25 million), was absolutely needed. 
Reparations should be limited to Germany’s capacity to pay, namely £2 million, a quarter of which to 
be paid through merchant ships and submarine cables, war material, State properties in ceded territories   16 
and claims against the latter and Germany’s Allies in respect of public debt; the remaining should be 
corresponded, with Germany free to choose the form of repayment, through thirty interest-free annual 
instalments beginning in 1923. A substantial relaxation of the coal clauses would have contributed to 
revive  the  country’s  hope  for  quick  economic  recovery.  With  the  help  of  a  Free  Trade  Union 
counteracting nationalism and the loss of organization and efficiency, European countries should have 
assisted Germany to regain prosperity, not least to the advantage of Southern and Eastern European 
countries. 
Even though the result disappoint us, must we not base our actions on better expectations, 
and believe that the prosperity and happiness of one country promotes that of others, that 
the solidarity of man is not a fiction, and that nations can still afford to treat other nations 
as fellow-creatures? (CW II, p.170) 
 
“Such  changes”,  however,  “would  not  be  enough  by  themselves”  (ibid):  the  atomistic  hypothesis 
recalled at the beginning of this analysis should be rejected for a second time being.  
In proposing a modification of the Reparation terms, I have considered them so far only 
in relation to Germany. But fairness requires that so great a reduction in the amount 
should  be  accompanied  by  a  readjustment  of  its  apportionment  between  the  Allies 
themselves (ibid). 
 
The  key  variable of  Inter-Allied debts had been hitherto only tacitly  introduced in the analysis to 
explain why Germany’s creditors should insist on collective animosities against the general welfare, 
including their own. Due to Inter-Ally indebtedness – amounting at £5,000 million; “The United States 
is a lender only. The United Kingdom has lent about twice as much as she has borrowed. France has 
borrowed about three times as much as she has lent. The other Allies have been borrowers only” (ibid, 
p.172)  –,  France  and  the  other  claimants  caught  in  the  dilemma  could  not  recede  from  asking 
impossible indemnities. Hence Keynes’s proposal for an all-round cancellation of those debts. The idea 
was in the air, writes E. Johnson (CW XVI, p.418); but the plan was nonetheless typical of Keynes the 
insider, the Treasury man, “dominated by the irresistible urgency to realize grand schemes, by the   17 
instinct to hazard a solution which could suddenly light a dark sky like a brainwave” (Ferrari Bravo, 
2002, p.9; our translation).  
The proposal dates back to November 1918; it proved to be of the most longeve of Keynes’s 
policy suggestions (see Markwell, 2006). Keynes asked his government – and initially against it, since 
Bonar  Law  had  judged  the  plan  as  “too  altruistic”  (CW  XVI,  p.419)  –  to  renounce  its  share  of 
reparations in cash to the advantage of France, Belgium and Serbia. This way Britain would have 
fortified its position while calling for a revision of the Treaty and trying to stimulate American largesse 
(Elcock, 1975). Once the reparation problem settled as such, in fact, it would have been possible to 
make “an appeal to the generosity of the United States” (CW II, p.93), and an onerous one, since the 
US  would  have  been  the  only  country  to  lose  real  debts  rather  than  “paper  debts”  like  those 
corresponding  to  credits  advanced  to  Russia  during  the  war  or  to  the  impossible  part  of  German 
reparations.  The  US  would  have  surrendered  £2,000  million  approximately;  Britain  would  have 
renounced to £900 million, while France would have gained £700 million and Italy £800 million, but 
Britain’s loss and France’s gain are inflated by Russian’s paper debts. 
Europe  was  entitled  to  ask  for  such  concessions,  Keynes  maintained,  since  the  financial 
sacrifices of the US had been comparatively lower with respect to those of the European states. Above 
all, the US “could better afford to make the sacrifice than Britain and the Allies” (Dimsdale, 1975, 
p.157). After condemning, in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, the US representatives at the 
Conference, “greatly at fault” for “having no constructive proposals whatever to offer to a suffering and 
distracted Europe” (CW II, p.94), Keynes compared the US and Britain’s sacrifices during the war. He 
strategically  omitted  references  to  the  deliberate  “until  the  depletion  of  Britain’s  reserves”  policy 
adopted by the American administration before assisting Britain and the role of “conduit pipe” (CW 
XVI, p.279) for US credits the Americans had imposed to London, and soonly recognized that the 
calculus of sacrifices could not “provide any compelling argument for Americans”, but only show that   18 
in asking for debt forgiveness, “an Englishman is not seeking to avoid due sacrifice on his country’s 
part” (CW II, p.175).  
  Academics dealing with Keynes the international negotiator have quite naturally insisted on his 
plea for American generosity as a fundamental element of his plans to construct a better international 
intercourse. Ferrari Bravo sees the attempt to “imbue the new hegemonic centre, the US, with the 
behaviour and ethics which pertain to the world creditor power” (1990, p.407, our translation) as the 
constant of Keynes’s diplomacy. According to Markwell, “Keynes joined others in appealing – [...] in 
The Economic Consequences – for US leadership in the international action they prescribed” (2006, 
p.91); and he did so because he “clearly believed that interdependence required management, and that a 
‘leader’ was a great asset (if not an essential one) in doing this” (Markwell, 1995, p.209). However, the 
interpretation here proposed of Keynes’s pamphlet as an essay in complexity might throw further light 
on the rationale of this appeal, which rests rests on interventions by actors lying outside the borders of 
the European conflict. This is obvious, in the case of America; more surprising as concerns Britain. 
True, Lloyd George had enlarged the risk of bringing the continent to ruin, and Britain was facing the 
economic problems of a difficult transition. But these, Keynes observed, were 
of a different kind altogether from those impending on Europe. [...] The most serious 
problems for England have been brought to a head by the war, but are in their origins 
more fundamental (CW II, pp.160-61).  
 
Even her share of Inter-Allied Debts was of a different nature, with respect to those of the Allies, since 
US credits to her had been advanced “to save civilisation”
 (CW XVIII, p.300) rather than Britain only 
and directly, so that while the Allies’ debts should be cancelled on the basis of the “foreign trade 
argument”, the argument for eliminating Britain’s debts to America was their “not chiefly economic” 
origin (CW XVII, p.277). In general, and more importantly, 
England still stands outside Europe. Europe’s voiceless tremors do not reach her. Europe 
is apart and England is not of her flesh and body (CW II, p.2). 
   19 
Though the appeal to American generosity could be “fairly” made “in view of US far less financial 
sacrifices”, the ultimate reason for it lay in that it was “inevitable” (ibid, p.92). However, inevitability 
has here an additional meaning: if a solution to European problems must come from America, this is 
because European countries’ claims cannot be reconciled with one another nor with the declared aim 
of a peace of magnanimity. Nor, above all, with Germany’s interests in reconstruction and stability – 
which coincided, in Keynes’s view of Europe as an organic world with Germany at its heart, with 
those of the whole continent. The dilemma of fixing a definite amount of reparations is a clear, and 
equally tragic, illustration of such an irreducible conflict. Within this framework – and after recalling 
that in A Revision of the Treaty, Keynes called for Britain’s unilateral action towards debt forgiveness 
should the US persist in their isolationism – the comparison of US and Britain’s sacrifices appears 
more as the tool for sharing the burden of external assistance to Europe according to the role held by 
each of the two countries during the war, than the “compelling argument” (ibid, p.175) which cannot 
be drawn from it.  
But the attention here posed to the method of Keynes’s analysis leads to conclude, more in 
general, that debts forgiveness was conceived as the precondition to solve the problems generated by 
the war. The plan was “absolutely essential to the future prosperity of the world” (ibid, p.171); “an 
indispensable preliminary to the peoples of the allied countries facing with other than a maddened and 
esasperated heart the inevitable truth about the prospects of an indemnity from the enemy” (CW XVI, 
p.422). Due to their bad financial situation and prospects, Keynes insisted, France and Italy were not 
even disposed to discuss the reparations issue – “You might persuade [the French] that some current 
estimates as to the amount to be got out of Germany were quite fantastic. Yet at the end they would 
always come back to where they had started: 'But Germany must pay; for, otherwise, what is to happen 
to France?'” (CW II, p.94n) – “unless one could at the same time point out to them some alternative 
mode of escape from their troubles” (ibid, p.94). After explaining the dilemma, Keynes generically   20 
called for a distribution of coal to be effected with an “even-handed impartiality in accordance with 
need” (ibid, p.60), but soonly afterwards argued that the problem, which was of a more general nature, 
required Britain and the US to enter “deeply [...] into the economic and financial situation as a whole” 
(ibid, pp.92-93). This task was rather accomplished in Chapter 7 of The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace, where Keynes revised and re-edited as an outsider the proposals he had suggested as an insider. 
  In  his  1926  pamphlet  against  laissez-faire,  Keynes  holds  that  the  cure  for  the  fallacy  of 
composition  between  particular  and  general  interests  which  is  typical  of  worlds  characterized  by 
complexity and interdependence lies “outside the operations of individuals” (CW IX, p.291); it has a 
social character and is provided by public institutions acting with a view to favouring common rather 
than particular interests. In 1919, Keynes was not so much asking Britain and the US a modicum of 
individual altruism, as to act with the spirit which is typical of, and demanded from, public institutions 
concerned with long-term perspectives and capable to “exercise public action grounded upon deliberate 
and reasonable [...] judgement” (Carabelli and De Vecchi, 2000, p.234). The most evident illustration 
of  this  scheme  of thought, in  Keynes’s  work  as  an  international  economist,  is  to be  found  in  the 
proposal for an international cure for the world slump of 1931. On that occasion, he echoed his “The 
End of Laissez-Faire” arguments to explain how countries may act against their own interest if caught 
in a situation of extreme uncertainty:  
Reasoning  by  a  false  analogy  from  what  is  prudent  for  an  individual  who  finds 
himself in danger of living beyond his means, he is usually, when his nerves are 
frayed, a supporter, though to his own ultimate disadvantage, of national contraction 
(CW IX, p.232).  
 
Acting, as often, with “a degree of folly which we should not excuse in an individual” (CW XVII, 
p.276), during the slump countries had given life to a “competitive struggle for liquidity” (CW XXI, 
p.42), i.e. 
an extreme example of the disharmony of general and particular interest. Each nation, 
in an effort to improve its relative position, takes measures injurious to the absolute 
prosperity of its neighbours; and since its example is not confined to itself, it suffers   21 
more from similar action by its neighbours than it gain by such action itself (ibid, 
p.52). 
 
In The General Theory, Keynes argued that the general solution to the struggle for liquidity lies in the 
“simultaneous pursuit [...] by all countries together” (CW VII, p.349), of policies of full employment, 
which require national autonomy as regards interest rate and investment policies. The Great Depression 
and the unqualified return to a gold standard showing lack of respect for the general interest in global 
stability,  however,  imposed  the  supra-national  cure  of  a  renewed  British  leadership.  As  a  public 
institution, possessing the “experience or the public spirit” (CW IX, p.236) to occupy that position, 
London “should regain its liberty of action and its power of international initiative” (CW XXI, p.57), 
which she alone, according to Keynes, could use to the “general advantage”, helping others to expand 
by expanding her own purchasing power. “We must set the example” (ibid, p.62), he contended.  
In 1919, Keynes adopted a similar attitude with regards to Inter-Allied debts and their economic 
consequences on the already exhausted finance of European countries. Their cancellation “would be an 
act of farseeing statesmanship for the United Kingdom and the United States, the two Powers chiefly 
concerned, to adopt it” (CW II, p.93). Though Keynes had been continuously referring to American 
“generosity”, he proudly claimed, in Burkeian terms, that the “force in this mode of thought” (ibid, 
p.179) lay in that “expediency and generosity agree together, and the policy which will best promote 
immediate friendship between nations will not conflict with the permanent interests of the benefactor” 
(ibid). The seemingly less important premise for US generosity, to be stimulated “provided Europe is 
making an honorable attempt in other directions, not to continue war, economic or otherwise, but to 
achieve the economic reconstitution of the whole Continent” (ibid, p.173), is on the contrary absolutely 
crucial. 
The question of inter-allied indebtedness is closely bound up with the intense popular 
feeling amongst the European allies on the question of indemnities – a feeling which is 
based not on any reasonable calculation of what Germany can, in fact, pay, but on a 
well-founded appreciation of the intolerable financial situation in which these countries 
will find themselves unless she pays (ibid, p.176).   22 
 
On reviewing how the Four came to sign the Treaty, Keynes had remarked that Britain’s hopes of 
securing  out  of  Germany  the  general  costs  of  the  war  –  induced  by  the  gloomy  prospect  of  the 
American debt – could but pose British “sacred egotism” (ibid, p.92) and juster claims of France and 
Belgium one against the other: 
the financial problems which were about to exercise Europe could not be solved by greed. 
The possibility of their cure lay in magnanimity. Europe, if she is to survive her troubles, 
will need so much magnanimity from America, that she must herself practice it. It is 
useless for the Allies, hot from stripping Germany and one another, to turn for help to the 
United States to put the States of Europe, including Germany, on to their feet again (ibid). 
 
Though somewhat contrary to common sense, but in line with a solution making “expediency and 
generosity  agree  together”, the  European countries’  commitment  to  reconstruct  Europe  rather  than 
continue war under other forms was a necessary counterpart of US assistance; in a way, it was both a 
result of and a necessary condition for it. Keynes’s aim was to show that greed rather than magnanimity 
would  have  turned  quite  paradoxically  European  countries’  attempts  to  liquidate  debts  against  the 
interests of the US itself. In his memorandum “The Treatment of Inter-Ally Debt Arising Out of the 
War” of March 1919 (later included in A Revision of the Treaty), Keynes maintained that “If the loans 
are to be met, a serious obstacle will exist to future trade relations between the Allies” (CW XVI, 
p.424): Britain should necessarily attempt to stimulate exports to the US and imports from the Allies, 
bitterly opposing trade flows in the opposite direction. That between post-war world and the pre-1914 
order with its well-established partnership linking the Old World with the New was in fact a false 
analogy: Europe could not rely, in the future, on US loans with a self-liquidating character, so that 
Keynes could argue that “[t]he unwillingness of American investors to buy European bonds is founded 
in common sense” (CW XVII, p.274). But this implies that  
If [...] the United States were to exact payment of the Allied debts, the position would be 
intolerable.  If  she  persevered  to  the  bitter  end,  scrapped  her  export  industries,  and 
diverted to other uses the capital now employed in them, and if the former European 
associates  decided  to  meet  their  obligations  at  whatever  cost  to  themselves,  it  is  not 
impossible that the final result might be to America’s material interest. But the project is   23 
utterly chimerical. It will not happen. Nothing is more certain than that America will 
pursue such a policy to the bitter end; she will abandon it as soon as she experiences its 
first consequences. Nor, if she did, would the Allies pay the money (ibid).  
 
In A Revision of the Treaty, Keynes concluded that “[t]he decisive argument, however, for the United 
States, as for Great Britain, is [...] the unlikelihood of permanence in the exaction of the debts [...] 
because of the great difficulty of the problem which the United States has before her in any case in 
balancing her commercial account with the Old World” (CW III, p.110). In effect, the US position was 
“exactly parallel to that of German reparation” (CW XVII, p.276). Keynes correctly saw that “America 
will  not  see  through  the  repayment  of  Allied  debt  any  more  than  the  Allies  will  see  through  the 
collection of their present reparations demands” (ibid, p.277) and insisted on the continuity between 
problems in future creditors-debtors relationships emerging from Inter-Allied debts on the one side and 
German reparations on the other. There lay, however, the possibility to treat them as parts of a unique 
question and solve them as such: 
The  settlement  of  the  inter-Allied  debts  is  intimately  bound  up  with  the  reparation 
settlement. The cancellation of the former would be a ground and an excuse for a sensible 
conclusion of the latter. On the other hand, France and Italy cannot be expected to forgo 
their own paper claims, unless they get quit at the same time of their own paper liabilities. 
It is nearly impossible, in my opinion, to settle the one question without the other (ibid). 
 
By playing the role of a public-spirited institution, the US would have thus promoted its own interests 
while “setting the example”. In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes exposed a second 
proposal, requiring cancellation of Inter-Allied debts as its precondition: winners, losers and even 
neutral countries expected to participate in the “grand scheme for the rehabilitation of Europe” (CW 
XVI, p.428). Britain and the US should have provided interest-bearing credit (£200 million) allowing 
Germany to issue bonds to a present value of £1,000 (75% to be used for reparations, 25% available 
for purchases of food and raw materials). Interest payments were to be guaranteed by the Allies, some 
neutral countries and Germany itself. The loan would have been given priority over any reparation 
claim, Inter-Allied debt and war loans; accordingly, borrowing countries receiving reparations should   24 
use them to repay the loan. “[T]he problem of restoring Europe is almost certainly too great for private 
enterprise alone”
 (ibid, p.434), wrote Keynes to the Big Three in April 1919 to justify the scheme. 
Due to the American refusal, the plan never saw the light. Two British reviews of the plan may 
help to explain its weaknesses. Disagreement by the banker Robert H. Brand with Keynes’s proposal 
was due to his qualified preference for cancellation of Inter-Allied debts. The grand scheme was a 
second-best, due both to its failure to cope with French and Italian debts and the risks inherent to the 
joint liability established by the plan (ibid, p.437). Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, held 
the  opposite  position:  it  was  time  to  “put  forward  a  constructive  policy.  To  propose  the  mere 
cancellation of debt looks as if we were trying to shift the whole burden on to America: to take part in a 
large scheme like the one proposed by Keynes is to show readiness to help shoulder the common 
burden” (ibid). According to the interpretation here proposed, both Brand’s and Chamberlain’s advices 
were based on right grounds. As to the former, it is to be remembered that while in The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace the proposal for an international loan lies in continuity with, and logically 
follows its precondition, i.e. the plan to eliminate Inter-Allied indebtedness, Keynes came to advance 
his suggestion for the “grand scheme” as a second-best alternative to the latter, which proved to be a 
non-starter. Brand’s remark was thus in line with the review Keynes made of his own plans in The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace. But Chamberlain was right to define Keynes’s “grand scheme” 
as a “shared responsibilities” plan – requiring the whole spectrum of countries involved to participate 
in the reconstruction – designed to put Europe on to its feet again.  
However, if for Keynes debt cancellation and international loan were but two linked means of 
solving a manifold, though unique problem, the US never came to conceive Inter-Allied debts and 
reparations as intertwined pieces of the same puzzle. As the editors of the American review “New 
Republic” made clear in their reply to an article by Keynes they published in 1928 under the title “A 
London View of War Debts”, Keynes’s proposals were believed to follow from undeserved incursions   25 
into the realm of morals rather than finance. The “American View of War Debts” was that if “both 
reparations and debt settlement must be scaled down and as a practical matter together”, “this must be 
justified by economic circumstances, rather than by the dubious moral attitudes with which Mr Keynes 
and his associates [...] were veiling the controversy” (CW XVIII, p.296). The American refusal to 
comply with Keynes’s plans – the Amsterdam conference of Winter 1919, or the attempt to promote 
the “grand scheme” by other (non-governmental) means, is but the last of a long series of “appeals 
unanswered” (Markwell, 2006, p.90) – was mainly grounded on the inflationist bias of the proposals, 
on fear that the British and European governments were trying to favour self-interest at US expenses, 
and contrariness to  further  inter-governmental  loans: the  renaissance of  Europe  should  come  from 
private activities and interventions on the part of European governments. 
Already in May 1919, however, Keynes was aware of the “dilemma” (CW XVI, p.439) in 
which  the  US  was  caught.  By  assisting  Germany,  the  Americans  would  have  enabled  European 
countries to extract a larger volume of reparations.  
They point out, with some justice, that our reparation proposals will take away from 
Germany her working capital, and that we are in effect asking them to restore the 
working capital to Germany which we have thus unnecessarily taken away (ibid). 
 
The American reasoning was correct, Keynes observed, but only to a certain point: Germany had no 
immediately  available  capital  left,  nor  liquid  capital  was  to  (and  could)  be  taken  from  her  for 
reparations. More importantly,  
even if we were to leave it to her the problem of her immediate future would not be 
solved. At the moment therefore the Americans are vainly trying to solve the problem 
of assisting Germany without assisting us, and they have not yet been able to alight 
on any method of doing this (CW XVI, pp.439-40). 
 
Such a method was simply unavailable: the European conflict could not be settled unless the ignition 
key  provided  by  US  assistance  to  the  continent,  including  Germany’s  creditors,  allowed  a  spiral 
movement  of  “magnanimity”  to  spread  along,  and  progressively  expand,  the  chain  of  countries 
disposed to take part in Keynes’s “shared responsibilities” plan. Lacking the starting engine of this   26 
figure of complexity – only a “gift element” and the gamble on mutual trust which goes along with it 
can create the preconditions of an agreement between actors otherwise destined to remain prisoners of 
an  irresoluble  dilemma;  only  a  gift,  a  principle  of  “something  for  nothing”  (Gouldner,  1973),  as 
opposed  to  the  “something  for  something”  of  the  norm  of  reciprocity,  may  provide  both  the 
“mechanism for stopping vicious cycles of social interaction” and the “ignition key” that activates 
reciprocity so that “the ongoing cycle of mutual exchange” can start up again (ibid) – the “grand 
scheme” could not materialize or work properly, as the unhopeful words Keynes spent to comment the 
launch of the Dawes Plan made clear. There might be much truth in the review of The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace Dennis Robertson (1920) published in “The Economic Journal”. If a bias 
could be detected in the book, he wrote in response to critics accusing Keynes of pro-Germanism, it 
was “a bias of hope against despair – of taking, where the future is at best uncertain, the risks of 
generosity rather than the risk of meanness” (ibid, p.84). But Washington had already refused to take 
the risk of generosity “by reason of their strong desire to clear out of European responsibility (without 
however realising what this will mean to Europe)” (CW XVI, p.440). 
 
5. Open Conclusions 
 
We have here explored the hypothesis of consistency between Keynes’s method as a way of reasoning 
in economics adapted to the complex nature of the material under consideration, and his approach to 
international economic relations in the aftermath of WWI. To repeate this exercise for other episodes of 
Keynes’s diplomacy, additional space and research are obviously required. However, we assume that 
the understanding of the method Keynes used to cope with the complexity of the economic material 
may provide useful insights to rethink his “international macroeconomics” (Vines, 2003). Scholars who 
are well acquainted with the developments which led to the Bretton Woods order, to the settlement of   27 
war debts and the shaping of financial policies for the transition to the new system can scarcely fail to 
remark, in our opinion, the striking similarities existing between, on the one side, Keynes’s diagnosis 
of the first post-war impasse and the character of the solutions he recommended to overcome it, and, on 
the other side, the vision of international economic relations he offered in the reform schemes of the 
Fourties to revive global multilateralism in a context of huge international imbalances. The mind easily 
goes, in particular, to Keynes’s 1945 memorandum Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III, which was 
to be the basis of the negotiations for the American Loan to Britain.  
Following the approach here outlined, further research on the topic should call into question 
Skidelsky’s (2000) account of Keynes’s “fighting for Britain” to revisit the economist’s diplomacy as a 
way of providing solution to an international impasse only apparently centred on Britain and in truth 
clouding, due to the importance of the Sterling Area for future world trade patterns (see De Cecco, 
1979), the prospects of global multilateralism. The stress on economic interdependence characterizing 
the whole bulk of considerations which led Keynes to design his plan for Bretton Woods may be shown 
to shape both his analyses of the dilemmas facing Britain (and, more in general, deficit countries) while 
entering the post-war world and his plea to London’s future partners for sharing the burden of Britain’s 
adjustment. The heretic proposal for an American Gift might then appear as Keynes’s call for an act of 
statesmanship on the part of a public-spirited leadership willing to allow its generosity to induce the 
Sterling countries to participate in a multilateral movement toward a more equilibrated order. Should 
these tests give positive results, today’s policymakers would be right to revisit Keynes’s international 
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